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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
W. DANIEL ENGLISH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Priority No. 16

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah

Case NO. 900422-CA

corporation,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) because this is an
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil matter in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

This matter was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court

to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(4) in an order dated August 31, 1990.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Rental Agreement could be extended for an

additional 36 months without a written addendum specifying the
amount of rent to be paid, the term of the extension and signed
by the parties.
-1-

2.

Whether English deprived Standard of possession of the

leased premises and is consequently barred from claiming an
enforceable lease after August 31, 1988.
3.

Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at

trial to support the finding that Standard failed to return the
premises to English in as good a condition as it was at the
commencement of the Rental Agreement.
4.

Whether English's failure to notify Standard of damage

and/or the necessity of refurbishing prior to English's
commencing repairs and refurbishing precludes him from recovering
related damages.
Regarding questions of law, the appellate court accords no
deference to the trial court's conclusions, and the standard of
review is "correctness."

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788

P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1989). See Addendum hereto for full
text.
RELATED APPEAL
Appellant believes that Century Park Offices, Ltd. v.
William R. Bireley, Case No. 900462-CA, presently on appeal to
this Court involves similar issues to the instant appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a landlord-tenant dispute.

In 1982

defendant/appellant, standard Optical company ("Standard"), and
-2-

plaintiff/respondent, W. Daniel English ("English"), entered into
a written Rental Agreement for commercial space.

On or about

January 30, 1989, English filed the instant lawsuit against
Standard.

English claimed that Standard defaulted under the

Rental Agreement by failing to pay rent due.

English requested

an award of damages for past and future rent and for expenses
relating to repairs and re-renting of the leased premises.
After discovery was conducted, a trial was held on
December 21 and 22, 1989 in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy presiding.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Judgment appealed from were entered on or about February 9, 1990.
On or about February 15, 1990 Standard filed its Motion to Amend
the Judgment on the general grounds of error in law,
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, and abuse
of discretion.

After both parties submitted memoranda, the trial

court entered its order denying Standard's motion to amend the
judgment on May 17, 1990. On June 7, 1990 Standard filed a
notice of appeal from the trial court's February 9, 1990 Judgment
and the trial court's May 17, 1990 Order denying defendant's
Motion to Amend the Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are undisputed and derived from the
court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and from the Trial
Transcript and Exhibits.
-3-

1.

On August 10, 1982, English and standard entered into a

written Lease Agreement for the lease of commercial real property
and a building located at 3525 Market Street, West Valley City,
Utah ("the leased premises").

See R. at 186 (Findings of Fact, f

1).
2.

The Lease Agreement provides in relevant part:
(a) To have and to hold said premises and
office space under the terms of this
agreement for a term of ten (10) years
beginning on the first day of the month
following written notice to Lessee from
Lessor and terminating at midnight on the
last day of the same month 10 years hence.
(b) The Lessee does hereby unconditionally
agree to pay his rent for the demise premises
and to Lessor, or order, at West Valley City,
Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum of $1,000
each month for 36 months with the first such
installment to be due and payable on or
before the first day of September, 1982, and
each installment payment to be due thereafter
on or before the same calendar day during the
term of the agreement. A grace period of
five days is given for the making of such
installment payment.
(c) The monthly rent specified in the
sections above shall be negotiated every 36
months.

(o) The Lessee does hereby agree to return
said premises back to the Lessor at the end
of this lease term in as good a condition as
the premises are at the commencement of this
lease, with only ordinary wear and
depreciation being accepted.
(p) It is mutually agreed that in the event
it becomes necessary for either party to
enforce the terms of this agreement with
-4-

court action, after default, that the party
determined to be in default will pay to the
opposite party all court costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
See R. at 186-189 (Findings of Fact, H 2); Trial Exhibit 4P.
For the Court's convenience, a copy of the 1982 Lease Agreement
is included in the Addendum hereto.
3.

On or about September 1, 1985, plaintiff and defendant

entered into a written addendum to the 1982 Rental Agreement
specifying a monthly rent of $1,200 to be paid for the 36-month
period beginning on September 1, 1985.
of Fact, f 3); Trial Exhibit 37D.

See R. at 189 (Findings

For the Court's convenience a

copy of the 1985 addendum is included in the Addendum to this
Brief.
4.

At the time of execution of the written addendum to the

1982 Rental Agreement, English understood that changes or
amendments to the Agreement were required to be in writing and
signed by the parties.

See Trial Transcript, Volume III,

pp. 12-13.
5.

Prior to June 1988, Standard understood the Rental

Agreement term to expire at the end of August 1988, with an
option to negotiate a renewal.

See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact,

f 6).
6.

Standard kept all rental payments to English current

through August 1988.

See R. at 190, 191 (Findings of Fact, Ml 5,

9 and 15).
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7.

On or about July 1, 1988, English met with

Stephen Schubach ("Schubach"), president of Standard at English's
office.

Schubach then informed English that Standard intended to

move out of the leased premises at the end of July.

.See Trial

Transcript, Volume I, pp. 82-83.
8.

On or about July 5, 1988, the parties began to discuss

a new rental amount and the possibility of subletting the leased
premises.

See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, U 10).

9.

On or about July 18, 1988, Standard ceased doing

business at the leased premises and moved out some of its
personal property,
10.

see R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, n 10).

The parties continued through August and September 1988

to negotiate for a lease renewal at a new rental amount beginning
September 1, 1988.

See R. at 190-192 (Findings of Fact,

Hit 10-17).
11.

On or about September 26, 1988, the parties met to

negotiate rent and discuss the possibility of subletting the
leased premises.

The parties failed at that meeting to agree on

a rental amount.

See R. at 192 (Findings of Fact, f 17).

12.

Prior to October 18, 1988, English began negotiating

with subcontractors to have extensive work done in the leased
premises.
13.

See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 131.
On or about October 18, 1988, English changed the locks

on the leased premises. See R. at 193 (Findings of Fact, f 23);
Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 132.
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14.

Before English changed the locks on the leased

premises, he did not notify Standard or obtain Standard's
consent.
15.

See Trial Transcript, Volume II, pp. 18-19.
On October 20, 1988, English1s attorney,

Gary Doctorman, wrote a letter to Standard.

The letter stated

that Standard was "in violation of the terms of the lease" and
that if it desired to "remain in possession of the leased
premises," it should make rent payments for the months of
September and October.

The amount of rent claimed due was not

specified in the letter.

See R. at 193 (Findings of Fact, U 25);

Trial Exhibit 12P.
16.

As of October 20, 1988, the parties had failed to

negotiate a lease renewal and rental amount.

See R. at 194

(Findings of Fact, f 26).
17.

The subcontractors hired by English began work on the

interior of the leased premises in the latter part of
October 1988.
18.

See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 45.

Plaintiff never made any mention to Standard of damage

to the leased premises or demanded repairs or cleaning of the
premises at any time prior to November, 1988.

See Trial

Exhibits 11 and 12; and See Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 63.
19.

On November 2, 1988, Schubach called English at his

home and told English that Standard would pay $1,000 per month.
In the same conversation, English asked Schubach to have
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Standard's property removed from the leased premises.

See R. at

194 (Findings of Fact, fl 28); Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 140.
20.

At the time of his November 2, 1988 telephone

conversation with English, Schubach was unaware that English had
changed the locks to the leased premises and engaged contractors
to do work in the premises.
21.

Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 64.

On or about November 7, 1988, Klaus Rathke, an employee

of Standard ("Rathke"), met with English at the leased premises.
At that time, Rathke asked English for a key to the premises so
that Standard's workmen could get into the premises to remove the
remaining pieces of Standard's property.

See Trial Transcript,

Volume I, p. 139.
22.

Sometime shortly after the November 7, 1988 meeting

with Rathke, employees of Standard obtained a key to the premises
from English's secretary and removed Standard's remaining
property from the premises.

See Trial Transcript, Volume I,

p. 139.
23.

Standard did not attempt to enter the leased premises

again until December 16, 1988 when Rathke again met with English
in the leased premises at English's request.

At that meeting,

English walked Rathke through the premises to show him the
extensive work he had done on the premises since October 1988.
See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 145.
24.

On or about November 21, 1988, English received a check

from Standard for $1,600.

See Trial Transcript, Volume I,
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p. 141; Trial Exhibit 17P.

A copy of this check is included in

the Addendum hereto.
25.

On December 2, 1988 English sent a letter to Standard

demanding payments for the months of October, November and
December and informing standard that he had three prospective
tenants and was nearing completion refurbishing the premises.
Trial Exhibit 13P.

A copy of this letter is included in the

Addendum hereto.
26.

On or about December 5, 1988, English received a check

dated December 1, 1988 from standard in the amount of $1,000.
See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 142; Trial Exhibit 18P. A
copy of this check is included in the Addendum hereto.
27.

English did not endorse the checks received from

Standard on November 21 and December 5, 1988, but did negotiate
them.

See Trial Transcript, Volume I, pp. 141-143; Plaintiff's

Exhibits 17 and 18. See Addendum hereto.
28.

English never made any demand on Standard to return the

premises to the condition in which it had been at the
commencement of the 1982 Lease Agreement.

See Trial Transcript,

Volume II, p. 23.
29.

English's understanding of the Lease Agreement was that

after October 5, 1988, Standard had no rights under the lease.
See Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 23.
30.

After a bench trial was held in this action on

December 21 and 22, 1989, the trial court found that "pursuant to
-9-

the terms of the written lease, the parties negotiated at the end
of the second thirty-six month term and on or about November 2,
1988 the parties agreed that the rent for the next thirty-six
month term from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991 would be
$1,000.00 per month."

R. at 197 (Conclusions of Law, 1).

31. The trial court further found that "Standard Optical
failed to pay the rent as agreed and breached the written lease."
And that "Standard Optical breached the written Lease Agreement
between the parties as they failed to maintain and repair the
premises, including the furnace . . . "

R. at 198 (Conclusions of

Law, Jin 2 and 3) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in determining that the Rental
Agreement could be extended for an additional 36 months without a
written addendum signed by English and specifying the amount of
rent to be paid and the term of the extension.

Standard1s checks

together with English's December 2, 1988 demand letter do not
satisfy the requirements of statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. S
25-5-1.

Under the statute of frauds and fundamental principles

of contract law, Standard's oral agreement to pay English $1,000
per month was insufficient to extend the Rental Agreement for an
additional term of years.

English deprived Standard of

possession of the leased premises and in doing so he failed to
provide consideration for an extension of the lease term.
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English was entitled only to receive the leased premises in
as good a condition as they were at the commencement of the lease
with only ordinary wear and depreciation being accepted.

There

was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the trial
court's finding that Standard failed to return the premises to
English in as good a condition as it was in at the commencement
of the Rental Agreement. Furthermore, English's failure to notify
Standard of damage and/or the necessity of refurbishing prior to
English's commencing repairs and refurbishing precludes him from
recovering related damages.
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ENFORCEABLE LEASE BETWEEN
THE PARTIES AFTER AUGUST 1988.
Despite the stated 10-year term in the Lease Agreement
entered into by the parties in 1982, the lease was an enforceable
contract only with respect to the terms for which a rental amount
has been agreed upon.

In effect, there was an option to renew

the lease every 36 months, provided the parties could agree upon
the monthly rent.

This was standard's understanding of the

effect of the lease and the basis for the testimony at trial that
Standard informed English that they believed the lease terminated
on September 1988.

See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 82.

Standard's interpretation of the Lease Agreement is
supported by fundamental principles of contract law.
A condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there be a meeting of
-11-

the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly,
with sufficient definiteness to be
enforced . . .
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427 (Utah 1961).

Even where the

parties may believe themselves bound under a contract, if the
terms of the contract are so vague and indefinite that there is
no basis or standard for determining whether the agreement had
been kept or broken, or to fashion a remedy, and where there are
no means by which the terms may be certain, then there is no
enforceable contract.

Candid Productions, Inc. v. International

Skating Union, 530 F.Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

Several courts

have applied these fundamental principles of contract law to
contracts for the lease of real property.

See e.g., Honolulu

Water Front Ltd. Partnership v. Aloha Tower Development Corp.,
692 F. Supp. 1230 (Dist. Hawaii, 1988).
There are three essential elements in an agreement for a
lease of real property: (1) a description of the property, (2)
the duration of the term, and (3) the rental consideration.
Karamanos v. Hamm, 513 P.2d 761, 762 (Oregon 1973).
It is well settled in the common law of
contracts that a mere agreement to agree, in
which a material term is left open for future
negotiation, is unenforceable. This is
especially true with respect to the amount to
be paid for the sale or lease of real
property.
Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 436 N.Y.S.2d
247 (1981).
-12-

It is well-established that because the amount of rent is an
essential term to a contract for the lease of real property,
leases such as the 1982 Lease Agreement in this case, providing
for future negotiation of the rent with no specified method for
determining the amount, are unenforceable.

Honolulu Water Front,

692 F.Supp 1230, 1235; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499
(Utah 1988); Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d
1317 (Utah 1976); Slayter v. Pasley, 264 P.2d 444 (Oregon 1953);
Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247. This is the
majority position on this issue and it has been expressly adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court in Pingree v. Continental Group of
Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).

Cottonwood Mall Co., 767

P.2d at 502.
In Pingree a lease granted the lessee the option to renew
for two separate additional five-year terms upon the same terms
and conditions of the original lease, except that the rental
amount would be renegotiated subject to a cap of $900 per month.
The lease further provided the factors of tax increase, cost of
business increases or decreases, business volume and success,
insurance costs and other reasonable allowances, would be the
basis for the terms of negotiation.

Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1320.

When the time for renewal arose, the parties were unable to agree
upon rent and the lessor brought an action to recover possession.
The lessee counterclaimed for enforcement of a five-year period
at $500 per month which was the amount the lessee had insisted
-13-

upon during negotiation.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the

option to renew was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable.
Id.
The court in Pingree followed a majority rule set forth by
an Oregon court in Slayter v. Pasley which stated:
A provision for the extension or renewal of a
lease must specify the time the lease is to
extend and the rate of rent to be paid with
such a degree of certainty and definiteness
that nothing is left to future determination.
If it falls short of this requirement it is
not enforceable.
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321 (citing Slayter, 264 P.2d 444, 446
(Oregon 1953)).

Following Slayter, the Utah Supreme Court

expressly refused to fix a reasonable rent for the parties when
their own negotiations failed.

Pingree, 558 P.2d 1317;

Cottonwood Mall Company, 767 P.2d at 502.
Under Pingree, the Lease Agreement in the instant case
created no more than a 36-month lease with an option to renew
every 36 months.

Applying the majority rule adopted by the Utah

Supreme Court, the Lease Agreement was not enforceable when the
parties failed to agree upon a rental amount and term beginning
on September 1, 1988.
The only way the Lease Agreement could be enforced after
August 1988 was if the parties entered into a written addendum to
the lease specifying the amount of rent to be paid for an
additional specified period of time.

This interpretation is not

only wholly consistent with Pingree, but it was also the
-14-

undisputed understanding of the parties.

This was established at

trial by the introduction of Exhibit 37D, the written addendum to
the Lease Agreement entered into between Standard and English on
September 1, 1985.
The addendum to the Lease Agreement specified the amount of
rent to be paid and the term of the extension.
was signed by both parties to the lease.
hereto.

Furthermore, it

See Addendum attached

English himself testified at trial that it was his

understanding that if the 1982 Lease Agreement was to be changed
or amended, it was necessary to have any such change or amendment
put in writing and signed by the parties to the lease.
Transcript, Volume II, pp. 11-13.

See Trial

Such a writing, moreover, is

required by the Statute of Frauds.
A.

There Was No Sufficient Writing Under The Statute Of
Frauds To Extend The Enforceable Term Of The Rental
Agreement Past August 31, 1988.

The undisputed evidence at trial was that the last written
addendum to the lease was executed in 1985 between the parties
and that addendum expired by its terms on September 1, 1988. See
Trial Exhibit 37D (included in the addendum hereto).

No further

written addendums were entered.
The court's conclusion that the Lease Agreement was extended
in November 1988 in the absence of any written addendum
specifying the amount of rent to be paid, the term, and signed by
both parties is not only inconsistent and contrary to the prior
conduct of the parties and their stated understanding of the
-15-

necessity of an express written addendum for the extension of the
lease, but it is also directly contrary to the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds.
At trial, defendant raised the defense of the Statute of
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1989), contending that any
amendment, renewal or extension of the 1982 Rental Agreement had
to be in writing sufficient to satisfy the statute.1

Trial

Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 76-77 and Vol. Ill, p. 54-55.

It was the

trial court's conclusion that:
[The] Statute of Frauds did not apply to the
renegotiation since the 1982 lease was the
writing in question, and that was the writing
subject to the Statute of Frauds, and there
was full compliance with the Statute of
Frauds and the renegotiated price was not
subject to the statute of frauds.
Trial Transcript, Vol. IV, pp. 4-5.
The trial court went on to say that even if the
renegotiation of the Lease was subject to the Statute of Frauds,
it found that the two checks from standard to English indicating
$1,000 payments together with a demand letter from English
demanding payments for rent and refurbishing of the premises
constituted the specific writing necessary to amend or extend the

During the course of the trial, the Court granted a
Motion by English to amend the Complaint to Include a
claim that the parties reached an oral agreement on
rent on November 2, 1988. The Court also then granted
Standard's motion to amend its Answer to include a
defense based upon the statute of frauds, Utah Code
Ann. § 25-5-3. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 41-45.
-16-

Lease Agreement.

Trial Transcript, Vol. IV, p. 5.

These

conclusions are contrary to the law and amount to the court
writing an agreement never reached by the parties.
Utah Code Ann. S 25-5-3 (1989) provides:
Every contract for the leasing for a period
longer than one year .... shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed
by the party by whom the lease .... is to be
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
There is no question that the 1982 Lease Agreement falls
within the scope of contracts required to be in writing pursuant
to § 25-5-3 and it is axiomatic that any material modification,
amendment or renewal of a contract required to be in writing must
likewise be in writing.

Contrary to the trial court's

conclusion, any modification of rent and extension of the 1982
Lease Agreement was also required to be in writing and signed by
English, "the party by whom the lease is to be made."
The trial court also erred in its alternative conclusion
that the two checks from Standard together with the December 2,
1988 letter from English satisfy the writing requirement.

The

checks are insufficient writings in two fundamental respects.
First, neither check is signed by either party.

Testimony

at trial indicated that the checks, Exhibits 17 and 18, were
signed only by Standard's bookkeeper and financial officer,
neither of whom was authorized to enter into a Lease Agreement or
even purported to be so authorized.
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See Trial Transcript

Volume III, p. 28.

English did not sign the checks at all.

Trial Exhibits, 17P and 18P (included in Addendum hereto).
testified only that he negotiated them.

See
He

The negotiation of a

check is evidence of nothing more than an intent to receive
money.

In fact, if anything is to be inferred from English's

failure to endorse the checks it is that he intended to avoid
their being construed as some evidence of an agreement with
another party.
Second, neither check contains any reference to a rental
term.

This, too, is an essential term to a Lease Agreement as

acknowledged by English when he signed the 1985 Addendum to the
Lease Agreement (Exhibit 37D). See also Trial Transcript, Volume
II, pp. 11-13.
English's letter to Standard also fails to satisfy the
statute, even when considered together with the checks and
circumstances at the time.

The letter contains the following

language:
I am writing concerning the lease payments
due for October, November and December. I
appreciate your full payment of September and
part of October. There still remains,
however, $400.00 for October, $1000.00 for
November, $1000.00 December, for a grand
total of 2400.00. I would appreciate it if
your bookkeeper would send us a check in that
amount in full.
We have three prospective tenants and are
nearing completion of the required
refurbishing.
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I am hopeful we can get the unit rented, our
settlement completed, and get back to
business-as-usual soon, (emphasis added)
Trial Exhibit 13P (included in addendum hereto).

At the very

most, this language could be evidence of an understanding on
English's part that he had agreed to settle with Standard if it
would pay $1000 a month until he was able to find a new tenant.
The language of the letter is, in fact, inconsistent with an
agreement for extension of the 1982 Lease Agreement in that it
suggests no intent to provide Standard with possession or any
control of the premises, and it discusses completion of
"settlement."

There is no indication that an agreement was

reached to pay a rent of $1000 a month over three more years.
No further significance is given to English's letter by the
check English subsequently received on December 5, 1988 from
Standard.

Trial Exhibit 18P (included in addendum hereto).

That

check predated English's letter by one day and indicates nothing,
other than a payment of $1000 to English. ,Id.
The Statute of Frauds may be satisfied by consideration of
one or more writings, not all of which are signed by the parties
only if there is a nexus between them.

Machan Hampshire v.

Western Real Estate, 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App. 1989).

The

nexus requirement may be satisfied either by an express reference
in the signed writing to the unsigned writing or by a reference
implied by the contents of the writings and the circumstances
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surrounding the transactions. Id.

In the instant case, neither

type of reference is present.
In addition, this Court has recognized that, to constitute a
sufficient writing, the memoranda "must set out the conditions of
the contract with adequate certainty."

Id. (citing Collett v.

Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730, 732 (1951)).
[W]ritings must so clearly evidence the fact
that a contract was made, what its terms are,
"that there is no serious possibility that
the assertion of the contract is false."
Id. (citing 2A Corbin On Contracts, § 512 (1950)).

Even assuming

that a sufficient nexus between the various writings exists,
there are no written memoranda containing the essential terms and
provisions for renewal of the 1982 Lease Agreement.

This is

especially true when one considers the writings in light of the
circumstances and actions of English surrounding their creation.
See discussion under POINT II, infra.
B.

Summary.

There was no evidence presented at trial which would provide
any reason for inferring that the parties agreed to extend the
valid period of the Lease Agreement.

Both parties knew that a

written addendum was necessary and they had prepared one for the
previous extension.

Their failure to make any effort to prepare

a similar addendum on or after September 1, 1988 indicates only
that no agreement extending the Lease under a new rental term was
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reached.

There is no legal or factual basis for a conclusion

that an enforceable lease existed after August, 1988.
POINT II
ENGLISH'S REPOSSESSION OF THE LEASED
PREMISES PRECLUDED THE
EXTENSION AND/OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT.
As of September 1, 1988, there was, as a matter of law, no
enforceable contract between the parties.

The lease could not be

extended without the parties agreeing on a rental amount to be
paid for a subsequent term.
While the evidence is unrefuted that between September 1,
1988 and November 2, 1988 no rental amount had been agreed upon,
the court did find that a rental amount was orally agreed upon on
November 2, 1988. R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, p. 10). The
court also found that English subsequently received a check for
$1,600 with markings indicating that $1,000 was to be applied to
September rent and $600 to be applied to a partial payment for
October rent and that a second check was issued by Standard to
English in the amount of $1,000 on December 1, 1988.

R. at 195

(Findings of Fact, 11).
Based upon these findings, the court concluded that the
parties had agreed upon a rental term for the next 36-month term
from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991 and that the lease
remained in effect after September 1, 1988. These conclusions,
however, are contrary to established law.

Even assuming that

Standard did promise on November 2, 1988 to pay $1,000 a month
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through August 1991, such a promise or "agreement" was
insufficient to extend the lease past August 1988.
A.

The 1982 Lease Agreement Was Not Extended For Lack Of
Consideration From English.

It is fundamental that a lease, like any other contract,
requires consideration to be given by both parties.

In exchange

for a tenant's agreement to pay rent, the landlord must deliver
consideration to the tenant in the form of possession of the
property.

The characteristics of a lease contract in the common

law include "a conveyance of a right of exclusive possession."
Bentley v. Palmer House Co., 332 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1964); Bodden
v. Carbonell, 354 So.2d 927 (Fla. App., 1978); Gage v. City of
Topeka, 468 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1970); Wash-o-Matic Laundry Corp. v.
621 Lefferts Ave. Corp., 82 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1948); Restatement
Second of Property-Landlord and Tenant, Section 1.2 (1977).
In the absence of this consideration from the landlord there
cannot be an enforceable lease.

As the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals has stated, "A lease is partly the conveyance of an
estate, which is deemed fully executed once the tenant takes
possession."

Matter of Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 41 (Id Cir. 1979).

"[I]f the lessee is deprived of peaceable possession, the
consideration for the contract fails.

It necessarily follows the

lessee's obligation to pay rent for these rights and privileges
conferred by the lease is extinguished."

Executive House Bldg.,

Inc. v. OPTIMUM Systems, Inc., 311 So.2d 604, 607 (La. 1975).
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The evidence at trial was unrefuted that English proceeded
to take possession of the leased premises during October 1988 and
never varied from that course of action.

On October 5, 1988,

English sent a letter to standard giving "notice of pending
lessee default for lease payments due September 1, 1988 and
October 1, 1988."

See R. at 192-193 (Findings of Fact, f 21),

and Trial Exhibit IIP.

There was no evidence at that time that

the parties had agreed upon any rental amount.
Subsequently, sometime on or before October 18, 1988,
English contacted Gordon Hellstrom and other workmen with respect
to beginning to refurbish or "repair" the leased premises.

Trial

Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 28 and 45. At that time, Standard had
not been informed of English's intent to have work done on the
interior of the leased premises.
On October 18, 1988, English changed the locks on the leased
premises without discussing it with Standard or receiving
Standard's consent.

Trial Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-19. At

the same time, or shortly thereafter, at English's request,
workmen began to do extensive interior work on the leased
premises.

See Trial Transcript Vol. I, p. 45.

On October 20

English's lawyer, Gary Doctorman sent a letter to Standard
declaring that Standard was in violation of the Lease Agreement
and demanding payment of rent.
25); Trial Exhibit, 12P.

R. at 193 (Findings of Fact, H

Standard sent a check to English on

October 20, but English subsequently returned it "because the
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parties had not yet arrived at an agreed amount."

R. at 194

(Findings of Fact, 11 26).
On or about November 2, 1988, a telephone conversation
between Schubach of Standard and English took place.

According

to English's testimony at trial, Schubach called him to say that
he agreed upon "the thousand dollars per month as the rental
figure."

Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 140.

English testified

that there were no subsequent writings signed by him or anyone at
Standard confirming this conversation.

Trial Transcript, Vol.

II, pp. 22-23. Nonetheless, it is upon this conversation that
the court bases its conclusion that the parties came to a
sufficient agreement to effectively extend the lease for 36
months beginning September 1, 1988.

R. at 197-198 (Conclusions

of Law, f 1).
The evidence at trial, however, established nothing more
than the fact that on November 2, 1988 Schubach said he would pay
$1,000 per month.

There was no offer by English to convey

possession of the premises to Standard.

In fact, in the same

conversation on November 2, English asked Schubach to remove
Standard's remaining property from the premises.
Transcript Vol. 1, p. 140.

Trial

English did not tender the keys to

the premises to Standard nor did he indicate any intent
whatsoever to give Standard possession of the premises.
English's course of action, beginning in the middle of
October 1988, was only to repossess the premises and to exercise
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complete control thereof.

In fact, it was English's testimony at

trial that, after October 5, 1988, his understanding was that
Standard "basically had no rights under the lease."
Transcript Vol. II, p. 23.

Trial

Consistent with his understanding,

English's actions after October 5, 1988 never suggested any
intent to deliver possession of the premises to Standard.

There

was thus no intent to give the necessary consideration in return
for an extension of Standard's obligation to pay rent.
The court found that Standard was never denied access to the
leased premises.

R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, in 29-32).

While

this may be true, it does not contradict the fact that Standard
never had or was offered possession of the premises after English
changed the locks on October 18, 1988.

The evidence presented at

trial indicated only that Standard employees were able to obtain
a key to the premises from English for the purpose of removing
Standard's remaining property as English requested.

Trial

Transcript, Vol. I, p. 139 and Vol. II, p. 36.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that where a landlord
changes the locks on a leased premises he has deprived the tenant
of possession, even where the lessee is able to obtain access
upon demand.

In Bass v. Planned Management Services, the Utah

Supreme Court stated "A person should not have to demand access
to a home which he or she is entitled to possess."
(Utah 1988).

761 P.2d 566

Other courts have similarly recognized that a

tenant is deprived of possession although the landlord allows him
-25-

a key to remove his belongings. See, e.g., Wishod v. Kibel, 496
N.Y.S.2d 544, 545-46 (1985). Thus, as a matter of law, the fact
that English allowed Standard to enter the premises to remove its
remaining property does not indicate that Standard had possession
of the premises.

The evidence is unrefuted that English took

possession of the premises on or before October 18, 1988 and
never again offered or conveyed possession to Standard.
Because the evidence at trial indicates that English never
gave any consideration to Standard in exchange for a promise to
pay rent, there is no basis for any finding that the parties
extended the valid term of the lease beyond September 1, 1988.
To impose additional obligations on Standard beyond those imposed
by the 1982 Lease Agreement and 1985 Addendum, additional
consideration was required of English.

The evidence is unrefuted

that he never gave or offered Standard any additional
consideration after October 18, 1988.

It defies common sense to

suggest that Standard would agree to be bound under the lease for
three additional years in exchange for nothing.
All the evidence presented at trial indicates English's
intent to not offer the consideration required of the landlord in
any enforceable lease.

The trial court's Judgment, holding that

from September 1, 1988 on, an enforceable lease existed between
the parties, should be reversed.

-26-

B.

Assuming There Was An Enforceable Lease, English
Himself Breached It By Unlawfully Repossessing The
Premises.

Assuming arguendo there was an enforceable lease after
August 31, 1988, English breached that lease when he changed the
locks on October 18, 1988 and unlawfully repossessed the
premises.
In Aldrich v. Olson, 531 P.2d 825 (Wash. App. 1975), the
Court of Appeals of Washington considered a case very similar to
the instant one.

In that case defendant, Olson, occupied a house

owned by Aldrich.

On September 17, 1971 Aldrich became concerned

when she had not received rent from Olson which was due on
September 1, 1971. Aldrich attempted to contact Olson by
telephone at his home and work.

She learned that Olson had quit

his job and his previous employer was unaware of his whereabouts.
Aldrich subsequently entered the lease premises with her own key
and discovered rotten food, garbage, and that certain items of
furniture and belongings had been removed from the property.
Aldrich thereupon cleaned up the garbage in the premises and
changed the locks on the doors without giving notice to defendant
Olson.

Several days later, Olson returned to the premises, broke

the lock, and removed his remaining property.
827-28.

531 P.2d at

The Court of Appeals assumed the validity of the trial

court's inference that Olson was no longer staying at the
premises and was intending to remove the remainder of his things,
but, nonetheless, stated:
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The most that can be said of those facts is
that Olson no longer intended to occupy the
premises. Intention not to occupy is not
necessarily an intention to surrender the
premises to the landlord and abandon the
leasehold estate. Legal abandonment
contemplates both an act or omission and an
intent to abandon. . . . abandonment must be
established by clear, unequivocal and
decisive evidence.
Aldrich, 531 P.2d at 828 (citing Tuschoff v. Westover, 395 P.2d
630 (Wash. 1964)).
The court in Aldrich found no support for any conclusion
that defendant intended to abandon his interest in the leasehold.
Under the circumstances, there was no clear, unequivocal and
decisive evidence that Olson had abandoned the leasehold prior to
September 18, 1971.

The court held that there was no support

for Aldrich1s action of changing the locks to the exclusion of
Olson's rightful possession.

"Accordingly, the 'lockout1

constituted an unlawful eviction."

Aldrich, 531 P.2d at 830.

The Aldrich court approvingly cited a law review article stating:
An eviction by the lessor suspends the
lessee's obligation to pay rent during the
time he is kept out of possession. And
instead of resorting to an action to recover
possession, the lessee may treat the lease as
terminated, thus relieving himself of any
obligation to pay rent which would otherwise
accrue thereafter. This rule applied when
the eviction is constructive as well as
actual.
In the instant case, the evidence at trial indicated that,
while Standard had moved its operations for this particular store
elsewhere, it still had property on the premises.
-28-

Trial

Transcript, Vol. I, p. 139.

Standard was furthermore still in

the process of negotiating rent, as evidenced by English's letter
of October 5, 1988.

Trial Exhibit IIP.

In addition, Standard

continued to pay utilities and, unaware of the lockout, tendered
payments to English on October 20th.

Trial Transcript, Vol. I,

p. 134.
English's unlawful repossession of the premises precludes
him from recovering under the lease.
covenant of quiet enjoyment.

Implied in every lease is a

An unlawful entry and eviction

clearly constitutes a breach of this covenant.

Where a landlord,

in the absence of an abandonment by the tenant, unlawfully
changes the locks on the leased premises, the landlord is himself
in default under the lease and cannot "retrench and take
advantage of his own reentry rights; he is precluded from
recovering the rents thereafter accruing."

Olin v. Goehler, 694

P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wash. App. 1985).
Generally recognized principles of contract law furthermore
preclude a party from enforcing a contract which he himself has
breached.

That is the case here.

Even assuming there was an

enforceable lease agreement after August 31, 1988, English
himself breached the agreement by unlawfully evicting Standard
and is, thus, precluded from seeking any recovery for any
obligations under the 1982 Lease Agreement or any renewal or
extension thereof.
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C.

Summary,

Because of English's repossession of the premises, there is
no basis for a finding of a default by Standard and, therefore,
the Judgment awarding costs, attorneys1 fees and lost rentals
should be reversed.

In addition, and for the reasons discussed

above, the Judgment providing for retention of jurisdiction
should be reversed.
POINT III
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR FINDING STANDARD
LIABLE FOR DAMAGE OR LACK OF REPAIRS.
Because there was no enforceable lease between the parties
after August, 1988, Standard was obligated only to return the
leased premises to English on September 1, 1988 "in as good a
condition as the premises [were] at the commencement of this
lease, with only ordinary wear and depreciation being accepted."
See R. at 189 (Findings of Fact, f 2).

There was insufficient

evidence presented at trial for the court to find that Standard
failed to satisfy this obligation.

Plaintiff presented no

evidence whatsoever of the condition of the premises at the
commencement of the 1982 lease.
Without any basis for a finding on the condition of the
premises at the commencement of the lease, this Court cannot find
that Standard failed to leave the premises in a sufficient
condition on September 1, 1988.

In addition, there is no

evidence of the condition of the premises at the time of the
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termination of the lease on or about September 1, 1988. There is
thus no basis for any comparison of conditions upon which an
award for damages to the premises can be based.
The 1982 Lease Agreement, by its express terms, obligated
Standard only to do repairs to the "premises during the term of
[the Lease Agreement]."
Addendum hereto).

See Trial Exhibit 4P, p. 3 (included in

The record is devoid of any evidence that

English gave notice to Standard of any breach of the lease with
respect to repairs or damage prior to November, 1988 —

a full

two months after expiration of the lease.
In fact, there is no evidence that any damage was done
during the lease term and not repaired by Standard before
September 1, 1988.

Items such as the furnace were not inspected

until late October or November 1988. Trial Transcript Vol. I,
pp. 28, 31 and 33.

It is perfectly possible that the furnace was

operating properly as of September 1, 1988 and even through early
October.

There is no evidence to indicate otherwise.

In the

absence of an enforceable lease through November 1988, there is
no basis other than mere speculation for a finding that Standard
breached an obligation to maintain the premises in good repair.
At the very most, the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient only to establish a removal of fixtures from the
premises.

Any damage resulting from the removal of fixtures was

more than offset by the $2,600 English received after October
1988.
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The judgment should accordingly be reversed to exclude all
items of damage.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court erred in
interpreting the law and awarding judgment in favor of W. Daniel
English.

The judgment below should be reversed and judgment

entered in favor of Standard Optical Company,
DATED this

/ffi^day of October, 1990.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MART1NEAU

By
George A. Hunt
Kurt M. Frankenburg
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 25-5-3
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS

25-5-3

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
History: ILS. 1898 & C X . 1907, § 2463;
C X . 1917, § 5813; ILS. 1933 * C. 1943,
33-5-3.

AUGUST 10, 1982 LEASE AGREEMENT

ASILilHIiil
j

THIS AGREEMENT made and executed in duplicate this 10th day of

j August, 1982 by and between W, Daniel English as party of the first part and
hereinafter called the Lessor, and Standard Optical Company, of Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as party of the second part and hereinafter
'* called the Lessee.
W

I T N E S S E T H

if
|i

That in consideration of the payments hereinafter reserved to be paid

!i
Ji by the Lessee to the Lessor and the terms and provisions of this agreement

il

!' to be kept and performed by each party to the other, the Lessor does by
ij
i.

J these presents hereby let and lease unto the Lessee, who does hereby agree
,i
1

to accept as leased property and premises and in accordance with the terms and

;i
;< provisions of this agreement, the following described office space and
i;

,' premises situated in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
!i more particularly described as follows:

i!
||
||
jl
;,
i
i'
!i

li

Commercial unit one (1) in the building located at 3525 Market
Street, in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
containing approximately two thousand-one hundred (2100) aquare
feet of floor space together with available parking space
allocated on percentage of total square footage each tennant
occupies of total building square footage.
To have and to hold said premises and office space under the terms

mz

jj of this agreement for a term of ten (10) years beginning on the 1st day of
[j the month following written notice to Lessee from Lessor, and terminating
I
jj at midnight on the last day of the same month ten years hence.
The Lessee does hereby unconditionally agree to pay as rent for the
, demised premises and to the Lessor, or order, at West Valley City, Salt Lake
! County.Utah, the sum of $1000.00 each month for 36 months vith the first
i
such installment payment to be due and payable on or before the 1st day of
September, 1982, and each installment payment to be due thereinafter by on
or before that same calendar day during the term of the agreement.

A grace

period of five days is given for the making of any such installment payment.
The monthly rent specified in the section above shall be negotiated
every 36 months.

It is mutually understood and agreed by these parties that the demised
premises herein will be used by the Lessee as a retail optical business and
Lessee does hereby agree to use said premises for no other purposes without

,

the written consent of the Lessor first had and obtained, however, such consent:
will not be unreasonably withheld.

I

The Lessor does hereby agree to pay the general taxes assessed against
the property and premises herein as belongs to the Lessor during the term
of this agreement.

J

The Lessor does also agree to furnish and pay for water

for the leased premises and to maintain the exterior of the building in which
these leased premises are located, except the glass, which shall be the
responsibility of the Lessee and as hereinafter provided.
The Lessee does hereby agree to promptly pay the charges for gas, heat,
electric service and telephone service, and to pay the taxes assessed
against all personal property of the Lessee as may be in or on the leased
premises, during the term of this agreement.

J

It is mutually understood and agreed that the premises herein leased
are in a condition of excellent repair and that the heating units and air
conditioning units, gas meters and electric meters are provided so as to
furnish seperate service to the respective tennants in this main building, and
with respect thereto it is understood and agreed that the Lessee herein will
be responsible for the installations of the gas and electric meters and
deposits thereon in the event the same is required by such respective companies
The Lessee does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this agreement
keep the heating and air conditioning units in a condition of good repair.
The Lessee hereby accepts the leased premises in a condition of good
repair and does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this
agreement to maintain the interior of said demised premises and keep the same
in a condition of good repair at all times, and agrees not to make any
alterations to the demised premises without the written consent of the Lessor
first had and obtained, and then that all such alterations shall be made at
the sole expense of the Lessee and that any such alterations as are then made
a part of or attached to the building shall remain with the premises and become
the property of the lessor at the end .o* this least* terr.

The Lessee does likewise agree to provide suitable floor covering (carpet, tild,
etc) of his choice in said premises, to be responsible for all repairs done or
needed to be done to the interior of the demised premises during the term of
this agreement.

I

It is mutually understood and agreed that in the event the demised
premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or other causes beyond the control
of the parties herein, that the Lessor shall have the right and option as to i
whether or not the premises and building shall be repaired or rebuilt, and in
the event the Lessor elects to make the needed repairs or to rebuild that an
equitable rental adjustment will be made during such time as the repairs
or rebuilding is being done, and on completion that the regular rental
payments will again become due and payable.

In the event the Lessor elects

not to rebuild or repair the premises, then it is agreed that the Lessor may
declare this agreement terminated in which event both parties will be excused
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein provided.
The Lessee does hereby agree to be responsible for all breakage to
windows and doors in the demised premises and not to install any signs on the I
demised premises without the permission of the Lessor.

i

The Lessee does hereby agree to accept the demised premises in a state
of good repair and be responsible for all costs for the installation of the
equipment of the Lessee in said premises.

|

As a material part of the consideration for this lease, the Lessee
covenants to carry adequate liability insurance, i.e. $100,000 - $300,000 in
connection with the use of occupation of the leased premises and in connection
with his business practice; and the Lessee covenants to save the Lessor's
premises from any claim or suit which may arise for any injury to any person
entering upon said leased premises, arising from the use of leased premises
by Lessee or the entry or exit of any patient or other person, or from the
failure of Lessee to keep the leased premises in a safe condition, with the
exception of negligence of Lessor.
The Lessee shall not sublet any portion of the leased premises without
the written consent of the Lessors first had and obtained.

Nor shall the

Lessee assign this lease in whole or in part without the written consent of
the Lessors.

Nor shall an assignment for the benefit of creditors or to a

1

Lessee, be deemed an exception to the prohibition against assigning or

i

i
subletting the leased premises.

If Lessee sublets any portion of the office, '
I
with written consent, over and above present agreed rent, then one-half of the!
sublet rental shall be added to total rent of Lessor.

|

It is agreed that the Lessor will not be liable to the Lessee on account
of any damage to any property of the Lessee in the demised premises on
account of the lack of any repairs to any equipment in the demised premises
as is the responsibility of the Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable inspection of the demised
i

premises at any reasonable time during the term of this agreement.

The

.

Lessee does hereby agree to at all times keep the interior of the demised
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in accordance with all good and

|

reasonable standards of like commercial units.

I

It is mutually agreed Lhat in the event of the failure, neglect or

J

default of the Lessee to make payments herein provided, as they become due,

j

or within the grace period, that the Lessor shall have the right and option

i

to proceed under the terms of the following provisions, or either of then:
(a) To declare this agreement terminated and proceed, with or without
i

legal process, to take possession of the demised premises and in which event •
i
this agreement will be terminated and each and both parties will be excused
?
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein set forth, or
(b) To take any action necessary to evict the Lessee from the demised
premises, and proceed to make any and all necessary repairs to the property
and proceed to rent the same to any other person, and in the event it is

i

necessary for the Lessor to take a reduction in the rental rate on said

'

demised premises that the Lessee will pay to the Lessor, all expenses in

I

connection with such repairs, r^rjnting and any loss of rentals, as may be
determined by the rates set forth herein.

In this respect it is agreed thai:

time is of the essence of this agreement and that the terms and provisions
herein set forth will extend to and become binding upon the respective heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns of these parties, and that the Lessee
shall have no right to make any assignment of any rights under the terms of
this agreement.

The Lessee does hereby agree to turn said premises back to the Lessor at
j the end of this lease term in as good a condition as the premises are at the
j
j commencement of this lease, with only ordinary wear and depreciation being
i! excepted.
.

The Lessee does hereby agree that all rental charges due by the terms of

if
this agreement will be a first lien upon all property of the Lessee in the
demised premises and that no part of such fixtures or personal property will
.«.\be removed from the demised premises until

all rental charges are paid.

It is mutually agreed that in the event it becomes necessary for either
party to enforce the terms of this agreement with court action, after default,
that the party determined to be in default will pay to the opposite party all
court costs and a reasonable attorneys fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said parties have hereunto placed their
signatures on the day and the year first abovs written

W. Daniel English
Lessor
LESSEE
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
)

SS.

day of,
, 1982, personally appeared
On the
/-^
before me
^k^j^c^c^
-&/. ^*>^<^£~<^&*^J? , the signer of the above instrument^
who duly acknowledged to me that he executecPthe same.
My Commission Expires:

il

1/

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah

LESSOR
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
)

SS.

_, 1982, personally appeared
, the signer of the above instrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the sant>
On the
before me

day of

ADDENDUM TO THE AUGUST 10, 1982 LEASE AGREEMENT

StptmbzA 7, 1915
jj

Addendum to tvut

agreement batuun

Standard

Optical

Company o{ Salt

Lakt

Y.City, Utah ktKunaitiK talltd tkt Ltutl and W. Vanitl tngluh, kvtUnaiWi
Kcalltd tht LU*OK.
VoAAQKaph 4, pagi 1 o{ agKumtnt i i changtd to Ktad ok iollcm:
"The Leiiee dou hvuby unconditionally agKtt to pay a* Ktnt
(OK tht dvnUtd pKtmtiu and to tht LtMOK, OK OKdtK, at VtAt
VaUUy City, Salt Lakt County, Utah, tht turn o^ $U00.00 tAch
month ioK 16 month* vUth tht iUut such vatattmtnt paptnt to be
due and payablt on OK bt{oKt tht lit day o{ September, 11 tS9 and
tach Jjut&Untnt paymtnt to 6t due thVLtinaltvi by on OK bt{0Kt
that *amt tattndoK day dusting tht ttw oi tkt agKttmtnt. A
SKact pvuLod o{ jive day* i i jiven {OK tkt making o{ any Mich
<AUaUmtnt paymtnt.9

IW WITNESS vmtOr tht said paKtiu kavt ktxtunto placed thtU iigmttu/ie
on tht day and tht ytM {iKU above mitten.
*

A

DECEMBER 2, 1988 LETTER TO KLAUS RATHKE
FROM DANIEL W. ENGLISH

2S21 ( A«rlui Jtirvri

jm. jD«mel JEn^Ii.l,. J D J D . ^ . . Jit*.

, ^ttmif M i l *

December 2, 1988
KlauA Rathke
759 J / 2 SooCfe M&cn

Salt

lake City,

Utah

841U

Good Morning Klaus,
I am uniting concerning tiie lease payment* due £or October,
November and Vecvnber.
I appreciate your £uli payment o&
Septwben. and pant oj OctoboJu_ There stltljiernaA ns^Jhpweven.,
J^
^^.OO.^oAJkJ^zii.^JlMP^0
Nbvmb2^,(^J^00^00
VecmS^^or'f^
a grand total o^ $2400.00. T would apprecXaXe*X JL^ your
bookkeeper would 6end us a check In that amount in &ull.
We have had three prospective
completion o& the required

tenants and are nearlng
refurbishing.

I am hopeful we can get the unit rented, our settlzment
completed, and get back to buslness-as-uAuai
soon.

W. Vanlel English,

VJV.S

OCTOBER 20, 1988 CHECK TO W. DANIEL ENGLISH
FROM STANDARD OPTICAL COMPANY
IN THE AMOUNT OF Si,600

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111

O

MEMO

"MCE
IE

INVOICE
NUM8ER

AMOUNT

3510 SEPT
87370 -ee^^e^nr-

l0Cp*0D

1

c

DISCOUNT

NET AMOUNT

800-00

800.00

a r . M , MM

800.00

2-00 .

O

o

DETACH BEFORE DEPOSITING

N?

^Standard
Optical

MAIN OFFICE
TRACY COLUNS BANK * TRUST
107 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT1AKE CITY. UTAH 84111

158% SOUTH MAIN
SALT LAKE COY, UTAH 64111

ORDER
OF

L

W DANIEL ENGLISH
GRANGER PLAZA SUITE #3
3531 SO MARKET ST
SALT LAKE CITY UT

~1

-3F

/

w- &

1007

10/20/88
DATE

DOLLARS
*1600.00*
PAY THIS AMOUNT

^**J^£^e£3£'<
84119

"•00 70 6 5"' Ml 21,0006 IUH
./

1240

1706S

r—

TO

31-61

PAY ******1.600* DOLLARS AND #00* CENTS

PAY.

7065

-J *

—fl

OOiSflqi 5"'

DECEMBER 1, 1988 CHECK TO W. DANIEL ENGLISH
FROM STANDARD OPTICAL COMPANY
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000

007515

blANDARO OPTICAL

A

DESCRIPTION

DATE

•87370

JUNT

NET AMOUNT

DEDUCTION

1,000.00

—

1,000.00

^V

/^^J> -fi

AJL^

CONTROL NUMBER

CHECK DATE

TOTALS

1007

12/01/831

1,000.00

007515

STANDARD OPTICAL

DATE

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT
B7370

<ECK DATE

2/01/88

NET AMOUNT

DEDUCTION

1,000.00

1,000-00

CONTROL NUMBER

1007

TOTALS

1,000•00

TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST
MAIN OFFICE
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111
31-61/1240

STANDARD OPTICAL
159Vfe SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CTTY. UTAH 84111

007515
17515

PAY

**-***•* 1 , 0 0 0 *

DOLLARS AND * 0 0 *

AY

DATE

OTHE
•RDEROF

CONTROL NO.

12/01/88
W DANIEL ENGLISH
GRANGER PLAZA SUITE #3
3531 SO MARI El ST
SALT LAf E CITY
UT

CENTS
AMOUNT

*1,000.00*

1007

84119
CfX^&

•^^Cii^^r'-

MtU^AUTWORIZEOSIGNATURE
E>"SIGNATI

»*00 7 5 15"*

«: i 2 1 , 0 0 0 9 , IUH

0 0 158 S I

5«*

COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
W. DANIEL ENGLISH,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 900422-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the following parties by causing a true
and correct copy thereof to be hand-delivered:
Gary E. Doctorman, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
50 West 300 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
DATED this /f^

day of October, 1990.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

George A. Hunt
Kurt M. Frankenburg
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant

